Indian Soldiers during the Siege of Kut
Post-2003 Iraq is now synonymous with sectarian strife, terrorism and rampant corruption. Buried beneath this recent history however, is an older one, replete with episodes of cooperation, unification and anti-imperialist struggle. The great Iraqi Revolt is one such incident, that taught lessons to British forces which was disregarded 13 years ago.
They, like the Brits, arrived to Iraq claiming to be 'liberators not conquerers'. The nationalist essence of both the revolt and resistance against coalition forces has been muted in recent years by sectarian inspired interpretations of Iraq's history - which this paper challenges.
They, like the Brits, arrived to Iraq claiming to be 'liberators not conquerers'. The nationalist essence of both the revolt and resistance against coalition forces has been muted in recent years by sectarian inspired interpretations of Iraq's history - which this paper challenges.
Since 2003, the reign of terror unleashed on Iraq paints an eerily similar tale to events that led to the establishment of its modern state. Whether under British, American or Ottoman rule or today’s existing elite, the oppressive exercise of power has never failed to stir chaos and mutiny.
The air of suspicion and distrust that loomed during the British mandate lingers on til today in a country whose history has been undoubtedly shaped by the insatiable appetite of external powers for oil and hegemony. While important differences distinguish the time of the British in Iraq from the Americans in 2003, a closer look reveals unlearned lessons and repeated mistakes by powers whose attempts to forcibly govern its people have failed.
The air of suspicion and distrust that loomed during the British mandate lingers on til today in a country whose history has been undoubtedly shaped by the insatiable appetite of external powers for oil and hegemony. While important differences distinguish the time of the British in Iraq from the Americans in 2003, a closer look reveals unlearned lessons and repeated mistakes by powers whose attempts to forcibly govern its people have failed.
Suspicion was exactly the reaction which greeted Britain's first Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force as it landed at Faw in 1914. Resistance against the colonial force was initially tame, but intervening Ottoman and regular armed Iraqi forces besieged Major General Charles Townshend’s garrison in Kut Al-Imara for 147 days, until their surrender in the winter of 1916. For Townshend, the defeat was labelled a blessing, one which arguably saved Britain “from being kicked out of Mesopotamia”.
Baghdad’s fall in March the following year signalled Britain’s first significant feat, but would soon be dampened by reluctance on their own part to deliver on the promise of Iraqi self-governance. Britain’s double dealing and attempts to captivate Arab hearts and minds held only limited sway. In cherry picking Sherif Hussein Bin Ali (Hijazi) to lead the Arab revolt, Britain worked to advance its interests by exploiting Arab discontent with Ottoman rule. Despite that, there was an unwavering acceptance of British forces as occupiers on Iraqi turf. As the Ottoman dynasty crumbled, a new vacuum emerged that came to be filled with a new conception of ‘Iraqi-ness’, but not one divorced from religion.
The commingling entities, nationalism and Islam, were central to the formation of a newly conceived identity, to which everyone could subscribe. This was one of the marking features of the 1919/20 uprising and the actions which made this possible. Although recent years have witnessed an alarming surge in sectarian-inspired frames of analysis applied to such an event, it would be incredulous to claim that sect X, Y or Z led the revolt, in the face of existing facts. Nationalism grew as a guiding yet burgeoning force, based not simply upon anti-colonialist sentiments. It was solidified beneath the shared desire for self-determination between Iraqis of all political and religious stripes.
Baghdad’s fall in March the following year signalled Britain’s first significant feat, but would soon be dampened by reluctance on their own part to deliver on the promise of Iraqi self-governance. Britain’s double dealing and attempts to captivate Arab hearts and minds held only limited sway. In cherry picking Sherif Hussein Bin Ali (Hijazi) to lead the Arab revolt, Britain worked to advance its interests by exploiting Arab discontent with Ottoman rule. Despite that, there was an unwavering acceptance of British forces as occupiers on Iraqi turf. As the Ottoman dynasty crumbled, a new vacuum emerged that came to be filled with a new conception of ‘Iraqi-ness’, but not one divorced from religion.
The commingling entities, nationalism and Islam, were central to the formation of a newly conceived identity, to which everyone could subscribe. This was one of the marking features of the 1919/20 uprising and the actions which made this possible. Although recent years have witnessed an alarming surge in sectarian-inspired frames of analysis applied to such an event, it would be incredulous to claim that sect X, Y or Z led the revolt, in the face of existing facts. Nationalism grew as a guiding yet burgeoning force, based not simply upon anti-colonialist sentiments. It was solidified beneath the shared desire for self-determination between Iraqis of all political and religious stripes.
| As protests mushroomed in Baghdad, Najaf, Karbala, Tel Afar, and elsewhere, they were read by the occupying force as localised events. Yet they were not unconnected from what was happening regionally, especially in neighboring Syria under French control. What the British viewed as a spell of tribal mischief that would gradually melt away actually snowballed into a common, cross-sectarian, insurgency, clothed in the language of nationalism and promoting an all-encompassing identity. Religious sects, described today as irreconcilably divided, ungrudgingly joined forces to coordinate industrial action, as had been proposed by Saleh Al-Hilli. There was also reciprocal engagement and observance when it came to religious ceremonies and festivities. Ashoura and Mawlid Al Nabi (prophet Mohammad’s birthday) were merged to mobilise Iraqis, regardless of religious differences. Mosques offered these communities spaces where they could mobilise politically. Nationalists, as Gertrude Bell wrote, “picked up their tempo in continual meetings at the mosques. Extremists are calling for independence and refuse moderation and these have dominated the mob in the name of Islamic unity and the rights of the Arabs”. Notwithstanding these joint efforts, recent scholarship remains guilty of privileging certain interpretations that valorise the struggle of one sect over another, serving to trivialise the nationalist character of the revolt. The accepted narrative holds that cross-religious mobilisation as either (a) ‘unprecedented’ or (b) presumes that mutual aversions are shared between religious sects. In his critique of these narratives, Usama Makdisi argues that these claims perpetuate an ‘orientalist paradigm’, which judges rather than analyses sectarian outlooks and practices. |  |
 | In light of the rich trove of accounts about the ‘Great Iraqi Revolt’ much disagreement is expected, such as on the question of where the revolt began. The village of Abu S’khair in the mid-Euphrates (and not the capital) is cited as one of several starting points. The triggering point is said to have been the ill-treatment of Sayyid Alwan Al-Yasri by a British Army captain, as they argued over Iraq’s independence. Yasri’s response was to rally indigenous masses in revolt of a system whose insensitivity could no longer be endured with patience. In Najaf, Ayatollah Taqi Al Shirzai also sounded calls for non-violent resistance, out of fear of suffering heavy casualties, but without obstructing those who chose the path of rebellion. |
Shirazi was instrumental in branding ‘love of the nation’ as a religious duty in his edicts (fatwas), promoting and inspiring collaborative efforts between the ulema and nationalists. Najaf, like the Middle Euphrates, was a significant launching pad for tribal insurrection. Others claim that the first ripples appeared in Tel Afar, after an Iraqi assistant officer to British forces, Adul Hamid Al Darbooni, led an uprising from within. Darbooni mobilised various forces and called on organised fighters, including the Sherifan Army of Liberation. Powerless in the face of angry dissenters and lacking ground troops, Britain responded by carpet bombing the town, but this only amplified dissent. Fierce battles erupted in Kifri and Kirkuk, Fallujah and Abu Mnayseer, while British supply ships were sunk and railway tracks were attacked. The use of airpower as an imperial technology intended to quash unrest and subversive activities therefore failed. Another little-known strategy involved irrigation, the aim of which was to govern the flow of the otherwise ungovernable Middle Euphrates. The British changed the course of the river tributaries, forcing tribes to locate elsewhere, furnishing the conditions for future tribal wars over land and water use.
| Misinformation also surrounds another famous incident of resistance at Khan Nuqta, a police post, east of Abu Ghraib and on the road towards Baghdad. On 12 August 1920, the head of the Zauba tribe, Sheikh Al Dhari, murdered one of Britain's most valued colonial officers, Gerard Evelyn Leachman, known for his exploits in the Arabian desert. Dhari had become increasingly dissatisfied with the way a foreign occupier was exercising brute force in his country. Leachman, unhappy with the Zauba tribe’s position on British governance, decided to pay Dhari a visit. The details of their conversation are unknown till this day, but the altercation led to Leachman being shot then stabbed to death by the chief of Zauba. Rumour has it that Dhari's son Khamis, was responsible for the shooting, but the story, as told by Sheikh Hatem Al Dhari (the sheikhs nephew) counters such claims. Khamis, as Hatem recounts, was out conducting raids against local bandit gangs, “Leechman was in fact shot by his younger son, Sulaiman”. |  Sh. Dhari Al Mahmoud (Left) Leachman (Right) |
History has been written in a way to bury these facts. "Dhari fought in the battles of Salman Beg and Kut, in which many of his men were martyred”, his nephew elaborated in an interview with FRB. As Ottoman soldiers surrounded British and Indian soldiers at Kut, Dhari’s men were called for by Khalil Pasha as backup, alongside an assortment of southern tribes. He, among tribal heads from the Middle Euphrates, coalesced beneath the aim of defeating occupant forces. Sheikh Hatem alleges that Leachman’s death had been premeditated, in revenge of the colonial officer’s actions and disparaging remarks towards Dhari. The incident dealt a huge blow to Britain, well summarised by a locally known idiom used by locals til now (هز لندن ضاري وبجاها) – 'Dhari shook London, and made her weep'. In Hatem's own words, “Sheikh Dhari was a true resistor that Britain went to all lengths to criminalise”.
 Map detailing the attack on the Mudaina railway by Iraqi insurgents |  Report dated 12th of July 1920 detailing the attack on the Mudaina railway by Iraqi insurgents |
However, by 2003 the nationalist banners of the 1920 ’Great Iraqi Revolt’ had morphed into sectarian slogans as Iraq fell under occupation for the second time in under a century. Similar to British officialdom, the manner in which America occupied the country did the exact opposite to diffuse potential unrest and limit coalition casualties. We see that lack of ground troops, aftermath planning and diminishing material funds are recurring themes across both historical timeframes. Though small pockets of Iraqi society cheered America and its partners on, fierce resistance awaited from segments of society that would be left destitute under a new American designed Iraq.
Dhari was forced to live as a fugitive until 1928, when an Armenian identified him on route towards Turkey, and turned him in to British authorities, allured by the 10, 000 silver rupee bounty on Dhari's head. On January of that year, he was convicted being complicit in Leachman’s death and given a life sentence. Due to old age and ill-health, his sentence was reduced to penal servitude for life, but in an unexpected turn of events, the following day Dhari was found dead in his hospital bed after receiving an injection from a British doctor. The official story was that Dhari had died from cardiac arrest. Dhari, like the other leaders of the Iraqi revolt – Sheikh Sha’lan Abu Al Joun, Seyyed Al Sadr, Imam Shirazi, Seyyed Al Haboobi and Seyyed Yasin – became iconic names in Iraqi popular culture and national memory, who at times receive fictional treatment, for the purpose of reinventing or promoting a certain identity.
Times of India 21 Aug 1920 Insurrection, in both contexts, took on a religious bend, as a duty that Islamic figures determined. The revolt in 1920 (framed as an anti-British Jihad) was waged in the name of Islam, but was also led by emergent nationalists and tribal bands. As the principle of sovereignty had yet to translate itself into an institutional framework, Iraqis drew on religion to justify the right to protect their lands and honour from the ‘infidel’. By 2003, the status of religion had been transformed into a mobilising tool at the disposal of actors wishing to exploit sectarian divisions in Iraqi society. The first order of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) - Debaathification – dissolved the Iraqi army into a pool of available recruits. The unemployed men staffed the very armed factions which sectarian entrepreneurs gave life to. Other exiled military formations returned to the country armed with new ideologies. They strove to reinvent an identity that had been shattered beneath America’s divisive policies and before that, punitive sanctions. These developments echo recent interpretations of the 1920 revolt, not as accurate historical interpretation but rather as acts of reimagining and rewriting history through sectarian lenses.
America’s inability to comply with its own promises also fuelled the emergence of a homegrown insurgency. The same line Britain touted in 1917 was pushed by America a century later; “we come as liberators not conquerors”. Iraqis did not buy this rhetoric. The fact that Britain and America accepted their status as occupying powers, beneath security council resolution 1483, to establish de facto control in the wake of Saddam's removal, provided a boost and durability to emergent guerrilla insurgency movements poised to defeat coalition forces. While resistance as a right is recognised under United Nations Security Council resolution 1514 (1960), coalition forces also have the right to prosecute those that resist. Iraqis soon learned (as they did in the early 1900s) that invading forces were more interested in securing their interests than building an egalitarian society. The very act of parachuting a pre-packed political elite, whose loyalties extend beyond Iraq (namely Iran), to rule the country made achieving that sort of peace impossible. Alongside hollow promises, excessive violence by occupational soldiers not only exposed the absence of a robust US game-plan beyond ‘regime change’, but also a repeat of past mistakes.
 Aid leaving sunni provinces to Najaf |  Qais Al Khazaali (Left) with Sunni Clerics requesting aid for the Battle of Najaf |
The night skies of Baghdad were permanently lit up by aerial bombardment, and countless bodies of the dead were strewn everywhere. America’s military might, in all its forms, laid down the foundations for interminable chaos which Iraq continues to suffers from today. Scores of unspeakable human rights atrocities in Abu Ghraib, Camp Bucca, and throughout Iraq’s largest population centres provided them with enough impetus to fight back against the occupier. An insurgency quickly formed with a clear target, which were coalition armies. However, in subsequent years these nationalist convictions dissipated gradually. Nationalism, by then, had broken down along religious lines, allowing for the growth of sectarian identities which mirrored the political system imported by Iraq’s ‘liberators’. The nationalist flames which burned brightly a century ago had been repressed, but even so, cooperation was still happening between different religious communities.
| An overlooked incident during the first battle of Fallujah in 2003 provides one case in point. As American forces battled against organised insurgent groups for control of the city, reinforcements were sent from an unexpected ally, Moqtada Al Sadr. Officers drawn from Jaysh Al Mehdi were sent to bolster resistance efforts against a common enemy. At the time of the battle of Najaf, The Association of Islamic Scholars in Iraq (AMSI) received a surprise visit from a Jaysh Al Mehdi representative, Qais Al Khazali. He appealed to AMSI to rally newly formed Sunni resistance factions to provide Khazali with military backup. |  Aid being unloaded by Al Mahdi Army after arrival at Najaf |
The following day, AMSI sent support in the form of food supplies and clothing, and in subsequent days, military officers sent by Sunni armed factions arrived in Najaf. These never before mentioned cases of joint resistance against a foreign invader suggests that nationalism still served as a motivating force for cooperation between sects, whether real or symbolic.
Tracking down these unfulfilled promises and blunders allows us to trace the seeds of Iraqi discontent. Once sewn, discontent has shown itself difficult to abate. A century later, hollow assurances sounded by Britain and America mirror similar misgivings about the structure of Iraqi society and colonial insensitivity towards its traditions, and therefore unlearnt lessons from recent history.
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