A secret Pentagon directive orders planning to try to destroy a militia group backed by Iran, but America’s top general in Iraq cautions of the risks.

​The Pentagon has ordered military commanders to plan for an escalation of American combat in Iraq, issuing a directive last week to prepare a campaign to destroy an Iranian-backed militia group that has threatened more attacks against American troops.

But the United States’ top commander in Iraq has warned that such a campaign could be bloody and counterproductive and risks war with Iran. In a blunt memo last week, the commander, Lt. Gen. Robert P. White, wrote that a new military campaign would also require thousands more American troops be sent to Iraq and divert resources from what has been the primary American military mission there: training Iraqi troops to combat the Islamic State.

The Pentagon directive and General White’s response — both classified internal military communications — were described by several American officials with direct knowledge of their contents. The exchange comes amid a simmering fight inside the Trump administration over policy toward Iran and the course of America’s war in Iraq, which began just over 17 years ago.

Iraq remains in a bind regarding how to secure energy independence within its geopolitical constraints – most pertinently the American sanctions on Iran. The US is continuing to maintain pressure on Baghdad by extending ‘final’ waivers on the purchase of Iranian gas for only another 30 days, as part of its new tougher stance. Iraq, in response, could produce credible plans to eliminate its dependence on Iranian imports, which it accelerated with the approval in January of the fifth round of gas exploration contracts. However, achieving this would not end the need for Iranian imports, nor would it secure any kind of energy independence. More importantly, it will not change the shortages in the provision of electricity, which have served as a lightning rod for public anger over the failings of the post-2003 system.

Appreciating the dependence on Iran for the provision of electricity means delving into the extraordinary mess that is Iraq’s power grid, consisting of the power plants that generate electricity; transmission system that transport this electricity to population centres; and distribution networks which then distribute this electricity to end users. Decades of conflict have damaged most parts of the grid and, coupled with poor maintenance of the parts that escaped damage, this has rendered the grid impotent. Rebuilding the grid post-2003 was hampered by the rolling dysfunction of successive governments, in which significant capital expenditures were neutralised by mismanagement, lack of coordination between ministries, and the county’s corrosive corruption. The public’s frustration over this impotence extends beyond the inadequate provisioning of electricity throughout the year, as the summer’s intense heat creates a particularly acute need for electricity, exposing the grid’s shortcomings.

These start at the generating stage with the gap between nameplate capacity, i.e. the maximum sustainable power output under ideal conditions, and actual output. While a gap always exists between these two, in 2018 the nameplate capacity was 30.3 gigawatts (GW), while effective capacity through the year was a mere 11.9 GW. A primary reason for this gap is the lack of appropriate fuel supply, in this case gas, which leads to substitutions by fuels such as crude or heavy fuel oil with the result that plants run at less than 60% of capacity – in 2018 only 62% of operating gas-powered plants actually used gas. Other reasons include poor maintenance and lack of cooling in high ambient heat. Moreover, up to 20% nameplate capacity in 2018 was non-operational.
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In turn, this increases the gap between demand and supply – in 2018 average demand was 17.7 GW vs. effective generated power of 11.9 GW. But this gap is only part of the story, as the electricity generated to meet demand does not mean that it was actually delivered to end users. The total electricity generated in 2018 was 105.4 terawatt-hours (TWh), but only 43.7 TWh reached end users for a loss of 58.5%. Most of these losses take place at the distribution stage, with technical losses stemming from age, conflict damage, poor maintenance accounting for two thirds, and non-technical losses, mostly electricity theft, accounting for a third. Technical losses are natural, however they occur at an extremely high rate in Iraq, as do non-technical losses. Stolen electricity – still consumed but not billed – is estimated at 17 TWh, and so the electricity delivered would rise to 61 TWh, equating to a loss of 42.2%. This dynamic can be seen below.

The rocket attack on March 11 that killed a young Scottish medic -- Lance Cpl. Brodie Gillon -- and two Americans in Iraq has raised once more the specter of resurgent Iranian aggression in the region.

The 26-year-old British reservist had volunteered for a deployment in Iraq. She was killed when 18 Katyusha rockets struck Camp Taji, where she was stationed, 25 miles north of Baghdad. A further 14 military personnel were wounded in the unprovoked attack. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo quickly identified that the rockets had been fired by members of an Iranian-backed Shi'ia militia, Kataib Hezbollah, part of al-Hashd al-Shaabi, the so-called popular mobilization forces. The Pentagon ordered retaliatory airstrikes against one of the Kataib Hezbollah bases, killing several insurgents.

​Al-Hashd al-Shaabi and Kataib Hezbollah have been itching to strike out against British and American troops in Iraq since their hero, Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani and their leader, Abu Mehdi Mohandes, were killed by an American drone strike at Baghdad Airport on Jan. 3. Soleimani was head of the Quds Force, the extra-territorial wing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, Iran's Gestapo, a listed terrorist organization.

He was one of the most vicious criminals in Iran's history. Pretending to aid the West in their war against the Islamic State, Soleimani oversaw the genocidal massacre of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Sunnis in the ancient cities of Fallujah, Ramadi and Mosul, leaving smoking ruins in his wake. The night he was killed, he had arrived in Baghdad to meet Mohandes, the al-Hashd al-Shaabi boss, to supervise a further crackdown on popular protests and demonstrations that had continued on the streets of Iraq's main cities for months.

While the world is consumed with the terrifying coronavirus pandemic, on March 19 the Trump administration will be marking the 17th anniversary of the U.S. invasion of Iraq by ramping up the conflict there. After an Iran-aligned militia allegedly struck a U.S. base near Baghdad on March 11, the U.S. military carried out retaliatory strikes against five of the militia’s weapons factories and announced it is sending two more aircraft carriers to the region, as well as new Patriot missile systems and hundreds more troops to operate them. This contradicts the January vote of the Iraqi Parliament that called for U.S. troops to leave the country. It also goes against the sentiment of most Americans, who think the Iraq war was not worth fighting, and against the campaign promise of Donald Trump to end the endless wars.

Seventeen years ago, the U.S. armed forces attacked and invaded Iraq with a force of over 460,000 troops from all its armed services, supported by 46,000 UK troops, 2,000 from Australia and a few hundred from Poland, Spain, Portugal and Denmark. The “shock and awe” aerial bombardment unleashed 29,200 bombs and missiles on Iraq in the first five weeks of the war.

The U.S. invasion was a crime of aggression under international law, and was actively opposed by people and countries all over the world, including 30 million people who took to the streets in 60 countries on February 15, 2003, to express their horror that this could really be happening at the dawn of the 21st century. American historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr., who was a speechwriter for President John F. Kennedy, compared the U.S. invasion of Iraq to Japan’s preemptive attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and wrote, “Today, it is we Americans who live in infamy.”
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Seventeen years later, the consequences of the invasion have lived up to the fears of all who opposed it. Wars and hostilities rage across the region, and divisions over war and peace in the U.S. and Western countries challenge our highly selective view of ourselves as advanced, civilized societies. Here is a look at 12 of the most serious consequences of the U.S. war in Iraq.

The US Army is set to pull out of three military bases in Iraq as it scales back operations amid escalating tensions with Baghdad and Iran.

Troops will withdraw from al-Qaim and two smaller bases as part of a move to reduce the US presence in the country and safeguard military personnel.

A formal handover of the bases and military equipment to coalition forces is expected to take place this week.
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It comes against a backdrop of intensified rocket attacks on foreign troops that has been blamed on Iranian-backed militias. The US also plans to withdraw from Qayara Airfield West, known as Q-West, and Kirkuk, but will retain five outposts in Iraq. A coalition statement said: “As a result of the success of Iraqi security forces in their fight against Isis [Islamic State], the coalition is re-positioning troops from a few smaller bases. 

Protesters, civil society, student unions and school children are forming their own alliance against the kakistocracy governing Iraq.

A ring of uncertainty closes in on Iraq, one of the world’s wealthiest oil nations, days after Prime Minister-designate Mohammed Allawi withdrew his candidacy.

The move reshuffles the political deck, reinstating caretaker Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi as head of government three months after he left his mantle over the unlawful death of 400 protesters. As the protest movement raises the stakes, can Iraqi President Barham Salih appoint a successor within the closing 15-day window, in accordance with constitutional law?

As the opening narrows, the political vacuum widens. Despite maintaining his position as caretaker prime minister, Abdul-Mahdi placed his responsibilities on hold, invoking "voluntary absence."

That means responsibilities administered by the prime minister, from leading meetings to talks with dignitaries, will be delegated to deputies. While Oil Minister Thamer al-Ghadban led the first session after Abdul-Mahdi excused himself beneath a leave of absence, experts said that only Salih is qualified to stand in place of the prime minister.

Iraq’s healthcare system is in crisis. There’s a shortage of drugs and the medical staff to administer them. Doctors are fleeing in their thousands. Patients are suffering.

​BASRA, Iraq - On the walls of Basra children’s cancer hospital hang photos of some of the youngsters who’ve been treated there. Most are smiling. Some of the portraits have a black stripe in the upper left corner. Those are pictures of children who passed away.  
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Hesham Abdullah says he quit his office job to care for his son Mostafa, 14, and sold his house and all the family’s valuables to pay for treatment. With no medical insurance, he estimates he has spent at least $120,000 on black market medicines and trips to overseas clinics. His family of five had to move in with his brother.

“It’s worth it. I’d sleep in the street in return for a pain-free moment for him,” said Abdullah. “But this is not something any individual can afford. This is something the state  should handle.”

SAMARA, Iraq — Fifty years ago, a much richer Iraqi government spent lavishly on health funding. The state company responsible for drug imports, known by its Arabic acronym KIMADIA, enjoyed such a close relationship with the world's top drug manufacturers that it would fax orders directly and shipments would arrive before a formal contract was drawn up.

In sharp contrast to the company's heyday in the 1970s and 1980s, today's KIMADIA does not have nearly enough money to cover Iraq's pharmaceutical needs.

In 2018, the state budget allocated $800 million for drugs. KIMADIA blew through it and accrued an additional $455 million in debt to pharmaceutical companies, in the end purchasing just 12% of the 535 drugs on its essential medicines list in large enough quantities to meet demand, said KIMADIA chief Mudhafar Abbas.
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The next year, in response to pleas by the health minister at the time, Alaa Alwan, for additional funds, the government increased KIMADIA's budget to $1.27 billion. But once the agency settled its debts, this left roughly the same amount of money as the previous year; $810 million.

This past week (Oct 2017), the Kelly family decided to unearth the corpse of their beloved family member and cremate his remains. In 2003, Dr. David Kelly, formerly a United Nations (UN) weapons inspector and member of the Ministry of Defence (UK), walked into the woods near his home, ate a couple dozen opiates, slit his left wrist, and died.

​That was the official cause of death, but conspiracy theorists believe Kelly was killed by members of his own government. Even now, after 14 years, many activists say an official coroner’s inquiry into his death should take place. But it’s what Kelly said, or was reported to have said, which some believe got him officially assassinated, and his death made to look like a suicide.

After 9/11/01, just as the United States needed Iraq to possess weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), so did the United Kingdom need the Middle Eastern county to possess them in an effort to get its people on board with a preemptive attack on a sovereign nation. Kelly was a chemical weapons experts employed by the United Nations to inspect Iraq’s chemical weapons programs.

In 2002, in an off the record interview with the BBC’s Andrew Gilligan, Kelly told reporters the dossier the UK Prime Minister Tony Blaire used to justify the invasion of Iraq was “sexed up” and that he had personally inspected the supposed mobile chemical weapons plants and stated they were nothing more than helium factories for filling balloons.

Iran’s network of influence in Iraq has taken a battering over the past two months. The loss of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp’s Quds Force commander, Qassem Soleimani, was a significant blow. Soleimani was an Arabic speaker with decades of experience operating in Iraq.

​But his killing came at a time when Iran’s go-to proxy in Iraq, Kata’ib Hezbollah also has been under unprecedented pressure. Its commander, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, was killed with Soleimani in January and was viewed by Iran as its military governor in Iraq. His loss and Kata’ib Hezbollah’s partial suppression mean that Iran and its proxies need to recalibrate their strategy in Iraq, and there are indications that alternative militias may be stepping into the breach.

Kata’ib Hezbollah operates under the umbrella of the Hashd al-Sha’abi (Popular Mobilization Forces or PMF), a coalition of armed groups that formed or expanded in response to calls by Shi’ite religious and political leaders in 2014 to prevent ISIS from capturing Baghdad. Iranian “special groups” — militias formed with Iranian support to resist Saddam Hussein and/or the United States — were the principle beneficiaries of this call to arms. Though hugely successful in pushing back ISIS, these groups initially were illegal under the Iraqi Constitution. This changed with legislation passed in 2016 that incorporated the militias into the armed forces.